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1. EU Laws on International Data Transfer
(1) The Need for International Data Transfer
　International data transfer is essential for companies that provide cross-
border services to customers. Travel agencies, hotels, airlines and Internet 
companies are typical examples of this. For example, hotel chains based in 
the European Economic Area (EEA) ─ which is made up of the twenty-eight 
EU Member States as well as Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein ─ some-
times need to transfer personal information they gather to a country outside 
the EEA when their customers stay at member hotels located outside the 
EEA. Other examples include Internet companies like Google and Facebook 
that may want to store the data of EEA customers in US-based servers. 
These are examples of transfer of personal data for business reasons (B to B 
transfers).
　However international data transfer is not limited to such B to B transfers. 
A foreign government may ask a private corporation to give it access to its 
holdings of personal data. Examples of this are Passenger Name Record 
(PNR) Agreements1） and the EU-US Terrorist Financing Tracking Pro-
gramme (TFTP).2） The EU has signed bilateral PNR Agreements with the 
U.S., Canada and Australia. PNR data can be used by law enforcement au-
thorities to investigate serious crime and terrorism. The EU has also signed 
a bilateral TFTP agreement with the US Department of the Treasury which 
1）　A passenger name record of the airline and travel industries contains the name 
of the passenger, contact details for the travel agent or airline office, the itinerary 
for the passenger and so on.
2）　The Programme allows the US to track terrorist money flows by accessing fi-
nancial transactions being processed through the network of the Society for 
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). SWIFT is a Bel-
gium-based company with US offices that operates a worldwide messaging sys-
tem used to transmit information on financial transactions.
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regulates the transfer of financial messaging data. These arrangements initi-
ated by the US were put in place as part of the fight against terrorism after 
the September 11 attack in 2001. These are examples of international trans-
fer of personal data from a business to a government (B to G transfer).
　In addition, international data transfer may be required between foreign 
law enforcement authorities. For example, they must be able to share crimi-
nal information if the criminal fled to another country or the crime was com-
mitted across borders. Also, data protection authorities may need to share 
their information with each other to deal with cases related to international 
personal data transfer. These are examples of transfer of personal data from 
a government to a government (G to G transfer).
　In the pre-Internet age, the amount of international data transfer was rela-
tively small. Thanks to the development of the Internet and its gradual per-
meation in our everyday lives, we are able to send personal data easily, freely 
and inexpensively beyond borders. This fact led us to realise that new rules 
were needed for international data transfer because it involved transfer from 
one jurisdiction to another.
　When cross-border data transfer involves conveyance to a data importer 
located in a third country where personal data is not protected to the same 
level, a data exporter may find it difficult to send the data to that third coun-
try. To address this issue and protect the personal data of EU citizens, the 
EU has established a fundamental rule that personal data should not be sent 
to a third country unless the country guarantees through its laws an ade-
quate level of data protection. This has been a source of difficulty for third 
countries and sometimes forced them to amend its data protection laws.
(2) EU Laws on International Data Transfer-Adequacy
(a) Outline
　To regulate international personal data transfers from the EU, Article 
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25(1) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the pro-
cessing of personal data and on the free movement of such data sets out the 
principal rule for international data transfer.
　This provision provides that personal data cannot be transferred to a third 
country unless that country ensures an adequate level of data protection, but 
certain derogations from the prohibition are contained in Article 26. These 
derogations include the data subjectʼs consent, the necessary data transfer 
for the conclusion or performance of contract and the legally required trans-
fer.
　The EU Commission possesses the power to determine on the basis of Ar-
ticle 25(6) of the Directive whether a third country ensures an adequate lev-
el of protection by reason of its domestic law or of the international commit-
ments it has entered into.3） This power has been given by the Council and 
the European Parliament.
　However, it had often claimed that the Directive was created before the 
development of the Internet and that it was rather outdated. In January 2012, 
the European Commission proposed a comprehensive reform of data protec-
tion rules in the EU. The Commission conducted final negotiations about 
texts with the European Parliament and the Council from December 2015. 
The reform includes two instruments, the General Data Protection Regula-
tion (GDPR)4） and the Data Protection Directive for police and criminal jus-
3）　The adequacy decisions do not cover data exchanges in the specific law en-
forcement sector such as PNR and TFTP which are covered by separate bilateral 
agreements.
4）　Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC.
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tice.5）
　The former will replace the Directive 95/46/EC with a view to providing 
better protection of privacy. A separate Data Protection Directive for the po-
lice and criminal justice sector aims to harmonise laws in this sector, so as to 
enhance the data protection of victims, witnesses and suspects of crimes, 
and to facilitate effective cooperation of police and prosecutors across the 
EU.
　On 8 April 2016 the Council adopted the Regulation and the separate Di-
rective. Consequently the European Parliament adopted them on 14 April 
2016. While the Regulation will enter into force on 24 May 2016, it shall ap-
ply from 25 May 2018. The Directive enters into force on 5 May 2016 and EU 
Member States have to transpose it into their national law by 6 May 2018.
　The European Commission claims that the Regulation will enable people 
to better control their personal data, and that at the same time modernised 
and unified rules will allow businesses to make the most of the opportunities 
of the Digital Single Market by cutting red tape and benefiting from rein-
forced consumer trust.6）
(b) Criteria of Adequacy Assessment
　Although the Directive 95/46/EC and a substantial part of the Member 
State data protection laws will be replaced by the General Data Protection 
Regulation in the near future, it appears to follow the same general line as 
5）　Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investi-
gation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal 
penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Frame-
work Decision 2008/977/JHA.
6）　See European Commission ─ Press release, Agreement on Commissionʼs EU 
data protection reform will boost Digital Single Market, issued on 15 December 
2015.
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the previous Directive in the area of international transfer of data.
　Article 41(1) stipulates that a transfer of personal data to a third country 
may take place where the Commission has decided that the third country 
ensures an adequate level of protection and Article 41(2) elaborates on the 
elements which will be taken into account in the assessment.
　Article 41(2)(a) stipulates that the Commission takes account of such as 
relevant legislation, security measures, effective and enforceable data sub-
ject rights and effective administrative and judicial redress. Also, Article 
41(2)(b) requires the existence and effective functioning of one or more in-
dependent supervisory authorities in the third country. Furthermore, Article 
41(2)(c) asks third countries to maintain the international commitments in 
relation to the protection of personal data.
　Article 25(2) of the Directive gives us a general idea that the adequacy of 
the level of protection shall be assessed in the light of all the circumstances 
surrounding a data transfer operation, and the Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Partyʼ,7） in WP 12, issued a document to clarify the meaning of ade-
quacy,8） but the Regulation further clarifies the criteria of the adequacy.
　Article 41(1)(a)(b) of the Regulation reflects the view of the 29 Working 
Party that the legal system of a third country will be examined through an 
assessment of both its content and enforcement. The distinction between an 
adequate level of protection of content (content adequacy) and that of en-
7）　The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party was set up under the Directive. 
It is composed of a representative of the supervisory authority(ies) designated by 
each EU country, a representative of the authority(ies) established for the EU in-
stitutions and bodies, and a representative of the European Commission.  It en-
joys advisory status and acts independently. The EU Regulation upgrades the sta-
tus of this Working Party to European Data Protection Board (Articles from 68 to 
76).
8）　ʻWorking Document Transfers of personal data to third countries: Applying Ar-
ticles 25 and 26 of the EU data protection directiveʼ adopted on 24 July 1998.
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forcement (enforcement adequacy) is important. The former is related to en-
hancement of protection level itself while the latter is the means or ways to 
achieve the former goal.
(c) Significance of the Charter
　The framework of EU assessment of adequacy is still evolving, but it has 
become clearer that the EU is seeking of third countries a high standard for 
adequacy. This trend has been strengthened after the European Union Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights came into effect. The Charter proclaimed in 2000 
became legally binding on the EU institutions and on national governments 
with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009. Article 
7 of the Charter provides respect for private and family life9） while Article 
8(1)(2) the Charter provides protection of personal data.10）
　Also, in recent cases, the significance of the Charter is underscored in the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). For example, in paragraphs 
68, 69, 81, and 97 of the Google Spain case (involving the right to be forgot-
ten),11） in paragraphs 47 and 48 of the Digital Rights Ireland and Others case 
(involving data retention period),12） and in paragraphs 74, 78, and 98 of the 
Schrems case which will be featured in this paper (involving EU-US Safe Har-
bour Agreement),13） the CJEU has stressed the significance of privacy and 
9）　“Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home 
and communications.”
10）　“1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or 
her.
　　2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of 
the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by 
law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concern-
ing him or her, and the right to have it rectified.”
11）　Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Espanola de Protection de Datos (C-
131/12) [2014].
12）　Digital Rights Ireland and Others (C-293/12 and C-594/12) [2014].
13）　Maximilliam Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner (C-362/14) [2015].
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data protection rights enumerated in the Charter.
　It becomes clearer that the EU wants to maintain a higher protection of 
personal data even outside of the EU, and the EU is thus unlikely to lower 
the level of adequacy standard for the protection of personal data. However, 
if the EU asks third countries to possess practically the same system, unsolv-
able complicated issues may occur.
(3) Difficulties of the US Safe Harbour Agreement
　In this paper, by analyzing the recent judgement on the EU-US agreement 
on international transfer of personal data called Safe Harbour, we will closely 
examine the current position of the CJEU on the adequacy standard and 
evaluate other devices available for cross-border data transfer from the EEA 
when a third country cannot meet the EU adequacy standard.
　The US, like many other non-EU countries, has been taking a different at-
titude toward privacy and data protection than the EU with a different legal 
regime.14） The US was therefore under pressure to change its data protec-
tion laws or find an alternative mechanism to facilitate the transfer of person-
al data from the EU to the US. In relation to the private sector, the US decid-
ed to seek an arrangement with the EU on data transfers so that companies 
could continue their business with EU-based companies as they had done 
before. After negotiation with the EU Commission, the US in 2000 concluded 
an agreement ─ the so-called US Safe Harbour15） ─ which was judged by 
14）　Schwartz mentions that the US never established EU-style privacy legislation 
nor institutions, and the EU had to make the concession because of its competing 
policy goals and the limits on its power in a global information economy (Paul M. 
Schwartz, ʻThe EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institution and Proceduresʼ 
(2013) 126 Harvard Law Review 1, 21─26).
15）　For details about the Safe Harbour arrangement, including a list of US compa-
nies which have signed up to the arrangement, see US Department of Commerce 
website.
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the Commission to provide an adequate level of protection.16）
　US Safe Harbor was a streamlined process for US companies to comply 
with the EU Directive on the protection of personal data. Intended for organ-
isations within the EU or US that store customer data, the Safe Harbor Prin-
ciples were designed to apply the EU level of protection to personal data 
transferred from EU-based companies to the US. US companies could opt 
into the programme as long as they adhered to the 7 principles and the 15 
frequently asked questions and answers outlined in the Agreement. Compa-
nies that fell under the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)17） 
or the Department of Transportation could avail of the agreement.18） The 
number of corporations using this programme had been increasing and 
reached over 4000.
　However, criticism of Safe Harbour had erupted since the so-called Prism 
problem came to light. This problem was triggered by Edward Snowdenʼs al-
legation that the US National Seculity Agency (NSA) was secretly accessing 
usersʼ private data in several Internet firms, including Facebook, as part of a 
surveillance programme. He was a former NSA contractor. Later, US offi-
cials were forced to confirm the existence of a huge, secret US Internet spy-
16）　ʻCommission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection pro-
vided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related frequently asked ques-
tions issued by the US Department of Commerceʼ Decision 2000/520/EC.
17）　The FTC have been taking a leading role in the creation and enforcement of le-
gal schemes in the privacy area (see e.g. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, 
ʻThe FTC and the New Common Law of Privacyʼ (2014) 114 Columbia Law Re-
view 583).
18）　Therefore, data processing by financial institutions, including banks, savings 
and loans, and credit unions, telecommunications and interstate transportation 
common carriers, air carriers, and packers and stockyard operators was excluded 
(15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2)).
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ing programme, codenamed Prism which had given them access to data 
from firms such as Google, Facebook and Skype. The programme started 
during George W. Bushʼs administration, and the actual size of the operation 
was unclear.
　Due to the fact that European personal data sent to the U.S. was affected 
by Prism, in 2013, the EU Commission issued a paper called ʻCOMMUNICA-
TION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND THE COUNCIL on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour from the Per-
spective of EU Citizens and Companies Established in the EUʼ.19） The docu-
ment elaborated on the problems of Safe Harbour and asks the US to make 
improvements on 13 points.
　The PRISM problem also ended up in the Irish courts. Facebook has 
founded a subsidiary (European headquarters) in Dublin. The subsidiary 
transferred their European usersʼ data to be stored on servers in the USA 
where the data was liable to be accessed by the NSA. Austrian student Max 
Schrems brought the case and argued that, because Facebook has founded 
a subsidiary in Dublin, the firm was subject to European privacy and con-
sumer law, that the way Facebook processes its usersʼ information lacks 
transparency or user control and that Irelandʼs data protection commissioner 
should investigate whether the firm passed its EU usersʼ data to the NSA.20）
19）　COM (2013) 847 final, issued on Nov. 27 2013.
　　The European Parliamentʼs Committee for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairsʼ final report published in February 2014 requested the Commission to 
suspend the Safe Harbour agreement (ʻReport on the US NSA Surveillance Pro-
gramme, Surveillance Bodies in Various Member States and Their Impact on EU 
Citizensʼ Fundamental Rights and on Transatlantic Cooperation in Justice and 
Home Affairsʼ A7─0139/2014, adopted on 21 February 2014).
20）　Article 28(3) of the EU Directive outlines Commissionersʼ wide range of pow-
ers on a non-exhaustive basis.  In line with the Directive, the Irish Data Protection 
Act specifies the Commissionerʼs power to investigate a complaint by an individu-
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　However, the Irish data protection commissioner claimed the controversy 
was a result of Snowdenʼs allegations and was a matter for the political level. 
He therefore denied the investigation of the complaint on the ground that 
the claim was ʻfrivolous and vexatiousʼ 21） which has a technical meaning and 
refers to where a complaint is unsustainable in law. He further pointed out 
that the transfer of data from firms in the EU to the US was subject to the 
transatlantic Safe Harbour arrangement which dated from 2000 and that, as 
a matter of Irish law, he was bound by this Commission adequacy deci-
sion.22） On recieving this Commissionerʼs decision, Schrems appealed to the 
al as follows:
　　“10─(1) (a) The Commissioner may investigate, or cause to be investigated, 
whether any of the provisions of this Act have been, are being or are likely to be 
contravened in relation to an individual either where the individual complains to 
him of a contravention of any of those provisions or he is otherwise of opinion 
that there may be such a contravention.”
21）　Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Irish Data Protection Acts provides as follows:
　　(b) Where a complaint is made to the Commissioner under paragraph (a) of 
this subsection, the Commissioner shall ─
　　(i) investigate the complaint or cause it to be investigated, unless he is of opin-
ion that it is frivolous or vexatious, and
22）　Section 11(2) of the Irish Data Protection Acts reads as follows (italics provided 
by the author):
　　“(2)(a) Where in any proceedings under this Act a question arises ─
　　(i) whether the adequate level of protection specified in subsection (1) of this 
section is ensured by a country or territory outside the European Economic Area 
to which personal data are to be transferred, and
　　(ii) a Community finding has been made in relation to transfers of the kind in 
question, the question shall be determined in accordance with that finding.
　　(b) In paragraph (a) of this subsection ʻCommunity findingʼ means a finding of 
the European Commission made for the purposes of paragraph (4) or (6) of Arti-
cle 25 of the Directive under the procedure provided for in Article 31(2) of the Di-
rective in relation to whether the adequate level of protection specified in subsec-
tion (1) of this section is ensured by a country or territory outside the European 
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Irish High Court for a judicial review.
　On 18 June 2014, the High Court adjourned the case, pending the referral 
to the CJEU.23） The Irish court asked the CJEU to examine whether an in-
vestigation by the Irish Data Protection Commissioner could be launched in 
Ireland or whether the Commissioner was bound by a European Commis-
sion decision that US data protection rules were adequate.24）
　On 6 October 2015, the CJEU declared the European Commissionʼs deci-
sion on the Safe Harbour agreement to be invalid. The Courtʼs consideration 
of the issues referred to it is divided into three parts: the powers of the na-
tional supervisory authorities, within the meaning of Article 28 of Directive 
95/46, when the Commission has adopted a decision pursuant to Article 
25(6) of that directive, the validity of the Safe Harbour Decision and the 
Courtʼs conclusion.
2. Summary of the Judgement of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union
(1) Investigative Power of the National Supervisory Authorities
　From paragraph 50 to 57, the Court of Justice of the European Union elab-
Economic Area.
23）　Maximilliam Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner [2014] IEHC 310.
24）　According to Travers, one of the lawyers who acted for Schrems in the case, 
the entire proceedings took just under 2 years (Noel J. Travers, ʻThe Schrems 
Case ─ Background & Consequences: An Overviewʼ Oral comment at a seminar 
held at Bar Council of Ireland in Dublin on 28 January 2016). Thus, he claims that 
the judicial review proceedings were initiated on 21 October 2013 and deter-
mined, following a full hearing in the High Court, a reserved judgement, a suc-
cessful application by Digital Rights Ireland to intervene as an amicus curiae, a 
successful protective costs order application by Schrems, and then the prelimi-
nary reference involving a full procedure before the CJEU, as well as finally a 
hearing to apply the CJEUʼs ruling in a day under two years.
Implications of the CJEU Judgement on the US Safe Harbour Agreement
81
orates on how the national authorities are affected by the Commissionʼs de-
cision. The Court ruled the finding that a third country does or does not en-
sure an adequate level of protection may be made either by the Member 
States or by the Commission, but a Commissionʼs decision finding that a 
third country ensures an adequate level of protection is binding on all the 
Member States to which it is addressed and is therefore binding on all their 
organs pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Article 288 TFEU,25） and thus 
until such time as the Commission decision is declared invalid by the Court, 
the Member States and their independent supervisory authorities cannot 
adopt measures contrary to that decision, such as acts intended to deter-
mine with binding effect that the third country covered by it does not ensure 
an adequate level of protection.
　However, the Court goes on to say that neither Article 8(3) of the Char-
ter26） nor Article 28 of Directive 95/4627） excludes from the national supervi-
sory authoritiesʼ sphere of competence the oversight of transfers of personal 
data to third countries which have been the subject of a Commission deci-
sion pursuant to Article 25(6) of the Directive and even if the Commission 
has adopted a decision, the national supervisory authorities, when hearing a 
claim lodged by a person concerning the protection of his rights and free-
doms in regard to the processing of personal data relating to him, must be 
able to examine whether the transfer of that data complies with the require-
25）　“A decision shall be binding in its entirety. A decision which specifies those to 
whom it is addressed shall be binding only on them.”
26）　“Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent au-
thority.”
27）　Each supervisory authority is endowed with investigative powers as follows:
　　“3 . Each authority shall in particular be endowed with:
　　─ investigative powers, such as powers of access to data forming the subject-
matter of processing operations and powers to collect all the information neces-
sary for the performance of its supervisory duties,”
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ments laid down by the directive.
　Having said that, the Court acknowledges that the Court alone has juris-
diction to declare that an EU act, such as the relevant Commission decision, 
is invalid, not the national courts nor the national supervisory authorities 
(paragraphs 61 and 62). The Court goes on to say that, in a situation where 
the national supervisory authority comes to the conclusion that the argu-
ments of the claim are unfounded and therefore rejects it, the person who 
lodged the claim must have access to judicial remedies to challenge such a 
decision before the national court (paragraph 64). In the converse situation 
where the national supervisory authority finds the arguments are well 
founded, the Court states that the authority must be able to refer the case to 
the national courts who, if they share the view of the authority, must refer 
the case for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice pursuant to Article 
267 TFEU (paragraph 65).
(2) Validity of Decision 2000/520
　As a basis for judging the legality of Decision 2000/520, the CJEU ex-
pounds the general principles for the determination of what constitutes an 
adequate level of protection from paragraphs 74 to 78. It claims that the 
mechanisms for the protection of personal data in a third country must 
prove effective in order to ensure protection essentially equivalent to that 
guaranteed within the European Union and that in the light of the fact that 
the level of protection ensured by a third country is liable to change, it is in-
cumbent upon the Commission, after it has adopted a decision, to check pe-
riodically whether the finding relating to the adequacy of the level of protec-
tion ensured by the third country is still factually and legally justified.
　Then the Court examines if the Decision on the Safe Harbour agreement 
satisfies the criteria from paragraphs 87 to 89. To sum up, the Court rules 
the Decision does not assure an adequate level of protection and finds two 
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major flaws in the Decision: one is that the transfers are conducted without 
protecting the privacy of EU residents, which is exacerbated by the fact that 
the US authorities have easy access to data including sensitive information 
sent to US- based companies under the US Safe Harbour principles, and the 
other is that there is no effective legal procedure to fight against interfer-
ence of this kind. These two deficiencies are emphasised again in para-
graphs 94 and 95. In addition, the Court mentions, in paragraph 90, that the 
Commission itself had noted the flaws in its own assessment of the imple-
mentation of the decision.28）
　Finally the Court declared, in paragraphs 97, the Commissionʼs Safe Har-
bour decision invalid on two grounds. The first ground is that Article 1 of the 
decision does not actually state that the U.S. ensures an adequate level of 
protection. The Court reiterates that Decision 2000/520 does not include 
enough content to show Safe Harbour sufficiently meets the adequacy stan-
dard.
　It should be noted that the Court rules that Article 1 of the decision is in-
valid, but does not examine the validity of the Safe Harbour principles or the 
relevant US laws. It is obvious that the Court has a certain concern about 
the content of Safe Harbour and probably the relevant US laws, too, but tech-
nically avoids straightforward scrutiny of them.
　The second ground is that Article 3 of the decision is invalid. Under this 
article, the national supervisory authorities may, without prejudice to their 
powers to take action to ensure compliance with national provisions, sus-
pend data flows to a US organisation that has joined Safe Harbour. However, 
this power to suspend data flows can be limited to particular circumstances 
created by national provisions.
28）　COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PAR-
LIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL ʻRebuilding Trust in EU-US Data Flows Com-
municationʼ COM(2013) 846 final and Communication COM(2013) 847 final.
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　In the end, the Court admitted that the invalidity of Articles 1 and 3 of the 
decision leads to the invalidity of the decision as a whole.
3. Analysis of the Judgement
(1) Commissionersʼ Investigative Power and Commission Decision
　Should national oversight authorities have investigative powers regardless 
of a Commission decision on ʻadequacyʼ such as the US Safe Harbour agree-
ment? While the Court admits that, pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Arti-
cle 288 TFEU, a Commission adequacy decision is binding on all the Mem-
ber States and is therefore binding on all their organs in so far as it has the 
effect of authorising transfers of personal data from the Member States to 
the third country covered by it, it concludes that the existence of the provi-
sion itself does not limit the investigative powers of national oversight au-
thorities conferred by Article 8(3) of the Charter and Article 28 of the Direc-
tive.
　The Courtʼs judgement is likely to lead to the amendment of the Irish Data 
Protection Acts (section 11 (2)) which provides that, when a question arises 
about the adequacy of data protection in a country that is the subject of a 
Commission finding of adequacy, the question shall be determined in accor-
dance with that finding.29）
　The Courtʼs construction is far from unreasonable considering the fact 
that Commissionersʼ wide range of powers were stipulated directly by the 
Directive and the importance of data protection which is strengthened by 
the introduction of the codified and unified human rights code called the 
29）　It was assumed that the then Data Protection Commissioner of Ireland was ex-
pected to be bound by the Commission decisions because of the existence of Sec-
tion 11(2) of the Irish Data Protection Acts which stipulated that a Community 
finding bound the Commissioner (cf. Denis Kelleher, Privacy and Data Protection 
Law in Ireland (2nd edn, Bloomsbury Professional 2015) 417.
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Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
　However, regardless of the existence of the above laws, any state agency 
should abide by the law and, except for rare cases in which illegality or inva-
lidity of a law is obvious to anyone, he or she should exercise the power on 
the premise that laws are legitimate and valid. Thus the authorities exercise 
the power under existing laws and EU decisions are part of them. Other-
wise, stable legal order and consistent law enforcement cannot be 
achieved.30）
　Furthermore, there seems no inconvenience for applicants who think 
their personal data have been misused under decisions or laws, if they can 
resort to a national court and are thus admitted the locus standi of the com-
plainant, and the court can refer the case to the CJEU. Even if a Commis-
sionerʼs investigative power is exercised where data transfers are authorised 
by a Commission decision, he or she cannot settle the case by judging the 
decision in question because the Court, as it mentions in paragraph 61, is 
the only institution which can rule the Commission decision invalid and the 
exclusivity of that jurisdiction has the purpose of guaranteeing legal certain-
ty by ensuring that EU law is applied uniformly.
　In fact, Justice Hogan of the Irish High Court who referred this case to 
the CJEU cites, in paragraphs from 32 to 37, and the CJEU precedent of Digi-
tal Rights Ireland and others case acknowledge the locus standi of the com-
plainant. Here only paragraphs from 33 to 35 of the former judgement are 
shown as the crucial part of the acknowledgement of the locus standi:
　“33 To establish the existence of an interference with the fundamental 
right to privacy, it does not matter whether the information on the private 
lives concerned is sensitive or whether the persons concerned have been in-
30）　Following the same line of criticism, see Foivi Mouzakiti, ʻTransborder Data 
Flows 2.0; Mending the Holes of the Data Protection Directiveʼ (2015) 1 European 
Data Protection Law Review 46.
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convenienced in any way (see, to that effect, Cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and 
C-139/01 Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others EU:C:2003:294, paragraph 
75).
　34 As a result, the obligation imposed by Articles 3 and 6 of Directive 
2006/24 on providers of publicly available electronic communications servic-
es or of public communications networks to retain, for a certain period, data 
relating to a personʼs private life and to his communications, such as those 
referred to in Article 5 of the directive, constitutes in itself an interference 
with the rights guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter.
　35 Furthermore, the access of the competent national authorities to the 
data constitutes a further interference with that fundamental right (see, as 
regards Article 8 of the ECHR, Eur. Court H.R., Leander v. Sweden, 26 
March 1987, § 48, Series A no 116; Rotaru v. Romania [GC], no. 28341/95, § 
46, ECHR 2000-V; and Weber and Saravia v. Germany (dec.), no. 54934/00, § 
79, ECHR 2006-XI). Accordingly, Articles 4 and 8 of Directive 2006/24 laying 
down rules relating to the access of the competent national authorities to the 
data also constitute an interference with the rights guaranteed by Article 7 
of the Charter.”
　Since a complainant has locus standi without proving that his or her right 
to privacy actually has been breached, it follows from the CJEU decision that 
such a complainant has a guarantee of legal redress before a court whether 
or not a Commissioner rules in her/his favour. In either case, the complain-
ant can resort to a domestic court and the court refers to the Court of Jus-
tice.
　Having said that, the Courtʼs construction of the Directiveʼs provisions on 
the powers of commissioners, in a manner that confers greater investigative 
authorities on commissioners, is persuasive. Moreover, you could say that 
exercising the investigative power does not substantially affect the legal or-
der or the consistency of application of laws because commissioners are not 
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directly denying application of laws, but are firstly checking or scrutinising 
problematic practices and laws.
　However, this construction suggests a Commissionerʼs investigation can 
be duplicative. Also, it seems unclear if a data protection supervisory author-
ity can prohibit cross-border data transfer when he or she finds the level of 
data protection in a third country is inadequate. Furthermore, this is not 
only a matter of the validity of the construction of the relevant provision, but 
gives rise to the question that the EU may require supervisory authorities in 
third countries to hold an equivalent power if they want to be seen from the 
EU as appropriate countries to maintain an adequate level of data protection. 
This problem may occur particularly when a third country has multiple or 
national and regional supervisory authorities.
(2) Content Validity and National Security Law
　The Court claims that the Commission decision enables interference, 
founded on national security and public interest requirements or on domes-
tic legislation of the United States, with the fundamental rights under Article 
7 and 8 of the Charter of the persons whose personal data is or could be 
transferred from the EU to the US and that the decision does not refer to the 
existence of rules to limit such interference.31） The Court also states that the 
decision does not refer to the existence of effective legal mechanism from 
interference of that kind.
　As previously mentioned, while the allegations of US whistle-blower Ed-
ward Snowden about the PRISM programme formed the background to the 
case, the Courtʼs decision was not formally based on an assessment of the 
proportionality of this programme or the oversight mechanisms put in place 
31）　Many privacy scholars including Travers, one of the legal representatives in 
the Schrems case stressed the significant role of the Charter in the Courtʼs rea-
soning.
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under US law. But it was clear that the content of these laws is in question.
　For data collection and processing by the National Security Agency (NSA) 
to combat terrorism, the Protect America Act (PAA) and the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act (FISA) play an important role. The Irish High Court 
dealing with the Schrems case recognized (although Justice Hogan carefully 
chooses his words) the fact that personal data collection by the NSA was 
done on a massive scale in accordance with orders made by the US Federal 
Intelligence Court sanctioning such activities, and that the Intelligence 
Courtʼs hearing were entirely conducted in secret, so that even the court or-
ders and its jurisprudence remained a closed book.
　On the contrary, the US contended that their laws were not as sloppy as 
the EU thought. On 8 June 2013, the Director of National Intelligence 
claimed that PRISM was an internal government computer system used to 
facilitate the governmentʼs statutorily authorized collection of foreign intelli-
gence information from electronic communication service providers (Section 
702 of FISA), and the US Government obtained information from them with 
FISA Court approval and with the knowledge of the provider based upon a 
written directive from the Attorney General and the Director of National In-
telligence. Also, the Director stressed that the collection of intelligence in-
formation was subject to an extensive oversight regime, incorporating re-
views by the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches.32）
　Furthermore, several weeks before the Court ruled on the Schrems case, 
the US Mission to the EU contended that the Advocate Generalʼs opinion 
rested on numerous inaccurate assertions about intelligence practices of the 
US, because the US did not and had not engaged in indiscriminate surveil-
32）　ʻFacts on the Collection of Intelligence Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Actʼ (http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Facts%20
on%20the%20Collection%20of%20Intelligence%20Pursuant%20to%20Section%20702.
pdf).
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lance of anyone including ordinary European citizens, and the Advocate 
General had disregarded changes made in the past two years, for example, 
President Obama had taken unprecedented steps to enhance transparency 
and public accountability regarding US intelligence practices.33）
　In any case, in the light of the Courtʼs judgement, it is not acceptable to 
the EU that the protection afforded to personal data under EU law can be 
weakened in response to US security concerns. Furthermore while the EU 
must now, in the light of the judgement, re-examine if the US intelligence 
laws provide an adequate level of protection, bearing in mind that they have 
undergone a two-year evolution,34） but that some US scholars criticised the 
US history of mass surveillance and still claimed that recent changes in the 
US hadnʼt made substantial progress.35）
　In assessing the justification for US Security laws, we should also refer to 
33）　ʻSafe Harbor Protects Privacy and Provides Trust in Data Flows that Underpin 
Transatlantic Tradeʼ (http://useu.usmission.gov/st-09282015.html).
34）　See e.g., the details of the USA Freedom Act enacted on June 2 2015.
　　The original title of the act is ʻUniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling 
Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnet-collection and Online Monitoring 
Actʼ. The law imposes some new limits on the bulk collection of telecommunica-
tion data by American intelligence agencies, including the NSA. However, the re-
form only applies to phone records and the NSA can continue to collect commu-
nication from the Internet and social networks.
35）　For one of the comprehensive and thorough articles, see Elizabeth Goitein and 
Faiza Patel, ʻWhat Went Wrong with the FISA Courtʼ (2015) Brennan Center for 
Justice at New York University School of Law (claiming that the world of electron-
ic surveillance looks entirely different today than it did in 1987 when the FISA 
Court was established to oversee foreign intelligence surveillance). For other ar-
ticles critical of FISA, see Julian Sanchez, ʻGovernment Discretion in the Age of 
Bulk Data Collection: An Inadequate Limitation?ʼ (2015) Harvard Journal Law & 
Public Policy, 2 Federalist Edition 23; Daniel Cetina, ʻBalancing Security and Pri-
vacy in 21st Century America: A Framework for FISA Court Reformʼ (2014) 47 
John Marshall Law Review 1453, 1463─1471.
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the recent judgement of the CJEU regarding electronic data retention. The 
Court declared, in the Digital Rights Ireland and others case, that Article 3 
and 5(1) of the EUʼs Data Retention Directive (2006/24/EC) was invalid on 
the basis that the Directive required electronic communication service pro-
viders to retain records of all means of communication without any differen-
tiation, limitation or exception being made in the light of the objective of 
fighting against serious crime. Although the retention of this kind could be 
justified on the basis of the necessity for the fight against international ter-
rorism and serious crime, particularly organised crime, the Court stressed 
the importance of the principle of proportionality. The principle requires that 
EU laws be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the 
legislation at issue and do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and 
necessary in order to achieve those objectives (paragraph 46).
　However, we are not sure if the standard set by the Court will be applied 
strictly to the US intelligence laws. It might be likely that the intelligence 
laws of the EU countries are not as far-reaching as those of the US.36） Both 
EU and US intelligence laws set the prevention of terrorism as a main pur-
pose, but the precise meaning may be different. The US must prevent terror-
ism attacks by domestic and foreign extremists alike,37） while the EU coun-
36）　However, the Snowden revelations suggest that certain EU Member States also 
engage in wide-ranging data-gathering for antiterrorism purposes, and his claim 
is well supported by the cases involving mass surveillance by governments (see 
infra note 56).
37）　Although it is claimed that FISA was firstly targeting foreign intelligence, the 
US government has or had been involved in mas surveillance targeting also US 
citizens since the September 11 attack in 2001, and this fact is accepted by the 
FISA Court on the basis that collecting irrelevant data was necessary to identify 
relevant data and the irrelevant data could thereby be deemed relevant (Elizabeth 
Goitein and Faiza Patel, note 35 at 21─22, 41─44, also see at 23─24 for a loophole 
for data sharing between intelligence and law enforcement officials).
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tries are likely to be focused on domestic or EU-located extremists. 
　As the Irish High Court which referred the Schrems case to the European 
Court mentions in paragraph 5, the US might be the only world power with a 
global reach which could effectively monitor the activities of rogue states, 
advanced terrorist groups and major organised crime. Also, the US has been 
compelled to step-up anti-terrorist activities after the nightmare of Septem-
ber 11.
　Therefore, the extent, manner of application and necessity of US intelli-
gence law enforcement may be different from those in other countries in-
cluding EU countries. Essentially the US intelligent service needs to have 
more power to meet the purpose of their intelligence laws. Then again, the 
same adequacy question will arise: how much difference will the EU allow to 
the US intelligence law?
(3) Alternative Options
　A few claim the only option for safeguarding EU citizensʼ data is to store 
them within the EU territory and never export them to a third country. How-
ever this will not be practical in all cases because there are certain data that 
should be exported to a third country. Maybe you can keep data related to 
social networking to a substantial extent, but no one denies the necessity of 
transfer of personal information on international financial transactions and 
passenger movements to a country where the protection level of privacy is 
in question.
　It is obvious that transfers that are still taking place under the Safe Har-
bour decision are unlawful, but in February 2016, a new agreement between 
the US and EU called Privacy Shield has been successfully negotiated. Be-
fore referring to the content of this new agreement, it is helpful to examine 
possible alternative options for data transfer from the EU to a third country 
in case of a failure of working an agreement.
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(a) Contractual Clauses
　Contractual clauses such as SCCs or BCRs (Article 26 (2) of the Directive) 
may be options for cross-border data transfer. We are not sure if the Court 
would allow EU and US companies to utilise these tools, because their na-
ture as a contract or in-house regulation cannot surpass binding domestic 
US laws and thus personal data of EU citizen will still be liable to be ac-
cessed by NSA.
　The Court stressed the importance of the protection of the rights set out 
in Article 7 and 8 of the Charter, and this effect will be applied to the usage 
of these tools, too. As the Article 51 (Scope) of the Charter stipulates that 
“The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies 
of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the 
Member States only when they are implementing Union law.”, the Charter 
may be presumed not to be applied to private contracts such as SCCs or 
BCRs. However, both schemes requires the authorisation by a data protec-
tion oversight body and the Commission (Article 26(3)(4)).
　In addition, the fact that the Commissionʼs decision admits data authori-
tiesʼ power to prohibit data transfer to a third country under SCCs38） sug-
gests that these schemes are under the supervision of the Commission and 
Commissioners. Since the Commission and Commissioners are bound by 
the Charter, the Charter should be applicable to SCCs. BCRs are in nature 
the same as SCCs, and thus follow suit.
　The Article 29 Working Partyʼs statement issued after the CJEU judge-
ment suggests that the use of SCCs and BCRs will remain acceptable until it 
finishes analysing the impact of the judgement, but it does not exclude the 
38）　Regarding SCCs, see Article 4(1) of Commission Decision of 15 June 2001 on 
standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to third countries, 
under Directive 95/46/EC (2001/497/EC) (cf. Article 1(2) of Decision 2004/915/
EC and Article 4(1) of Decision 2010/87/EU).
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possibility of data protection authoritiesʼ investigations during that period.39） 
That means companies using these tools may face a second Schrems-like le-
gal attack in the future. Moreover, it is reported that the Schleswig-Holstein 
Data Protection Authority (German regional DPA) issued a position paper 
indicating that these schemes would not work as a long-term solution.40）
　These facts suggest that any contract mechanism should observe the level 
of data protection stipulated in the Charter. It thus seems to be clear that 
EU-based companies cannot send personal data to a third country where 
these schemes are subject to imperative orders or statutes such as intelli-
gence laws which may allow indiscriminate mass personal data gathering 
and thus interfere with the right to personal data protection of EU citizens.
　In fact, on 31 May 2016, the Data Protection Commissioner of Ireland 
commenced proceedings in the Irish High Court to seek a reference to the 
CJEU in relation to the SCCs mechanism41） under which, at present, person-
al data can be transferred from the EU to the US.42） Schrems and Facebook 
Ireland Limited are named as the joining of the proceedings. One week be-
fore the commencement of the proceedings, the Commissioner issues a 
draft decision to both parties noting that the Commissioner had formed the 
39）　ʻStatement of the Article 29 Working Partyʼ issued on 16 October 2015.
40）　See e.g., https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2015/10/14/german-dpa-issues-
position-paper-on-data-transfer-mechanisms-in-light-of-cjeu-safe-harbor-decision/, 
and the original German text is as follows: https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/
files/2015/10/20151014_ULD-Positionspapier-zum-EuGH-Urteil.pdf.
41）　An explanatory memo on the proceedings by the Data Protection Commission-
er titled ʻUpdate on Litigation Involving Facebook and Maximilian Schremsʼ is 
available at https://www.dataprotection.ie/docs/28-9-2016-Explanatory-memo-on-
litigation-involving-Facebook-and-Maximilian-Schrems/1598.htm.
42）　Section 7 and 8 of this memo mentions that Facebook continues to transfer per-
sonal data to Facebook Inc. in the US based on SCCs and many other countries 
also use SCCs to send personal data to the US.
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preliminary view that SCCs were likely to offend Article 47 of the Charter in 
which the right to an effective legal remedy is stipulated.
(b) Consent
　Alternatively, some still believe acquiring customersʼ consent (Article 26 
(1) of the Directive) is the best solution to this problem.43） Since the right of 
personal data protection is a subjective right, you can accept its invasion by 
giving consent. Therefore, it is suitable for consent to be included in one of 
the derogation provisions. However, consent is not an almighty tool and 
heavily relying on consent in international transfers in particular involves al-
most unsolvable issues. Although I cannot expound the flaws of consent in 
detail in this article, Daniel Solove and Helen Nissenbaum are among the 
well-known critics of the idea of privacy self-management which takes refuge 
in consent while both do not deny the role of self-control of privacy in an ap-
propriate place.44）
　The Article 29 Working Party, too, rightly expresses the view in WP 114 
that consent is unlikely to be a useful alternative for repeated or structural 
(excluding occasional transfer) international data transfer45） and its state-
ment mentioned above does not refer to the use of consent as an alternative 
measure.46） In conclusion, consent is not fundamentally regarded as a useful 
43）　The EU Regulation stipulates requirements of valid consent in a detailed way 
(Article 7) and newly established a provision for conditions applicable to childʼs 
consent in relation to information society services (Article 8).
44）　See e.g., Daniel J. Solove, ʻIntroduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Con-
sent Dilemmaʼ (2013) 126 Harvard Law Review 1880; Helen Nissenbaum, ʻA Con-
textual Approach to Privacy Onlineʼ (Fall 2011) 140 Dœdalus, Journal of the 
American Academy of Arts & Sciences 32.
45）　ʻWorking document on a common interpretation of Article 26(1) of Directive 
95/46/EC of 24 October 1995ʼ adopted on 25 November 2005, p. 11. This point is 
stressed on page 27 of WP 187 in a later document, too (ʻOpinion 15/2011 on the 
definition of consentʼ adopted on 13 July 2011).
46）　ʻStatement of the Article 29 Working Partyʼ, note 39.
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alternative tool for continual international data transfer.
　In any case, if these derogative measures such as SCCs, BCRs and con-
sent are successfully applicable to data transfer from the EU to the US, the 
impact of the judgement on the Safe Harbour agreement would be substan-
tially diminished in cross-border data transfer, but this is not likely as long as 
the US maintains the previous privacy laws. Then, the second Safe Harbour 
agreement seems to be the only hope for relevant companies like Facebook 
within EU countries, which actually has happened recently.
4. Implications for the Future
(1) Hectic Future for the Commission and Commissioners
　It seems a busy future awaits the Commission and Commissioners. Firstly, 
as the list of assessment subjects is expanded on Article 45(1) of the Regula-
tion so as to include international organisations, the process of judging ade-
quacy will require significantly more time, cost and resources47） which is 
amplified by the extended roles and responsibilities of the authorities since 
the advent of the Internet.
　Secondly, Although Article 45(1) of the Regulation clarifies that the Com-
mission may decide if a third country, territory or one or more specified sec-
tors within that third country, or an international organisation ensures an ad-
equate level of protection, Article 52(1)(f), 57(1)(h) and 58(2)(j) gives each 
commissioner the power to investigate a relevant complaint regarding the 
　　The Article 29 Working party expressed the opinion on the constructions, 
meanings and applications of consent provisions under the Data Protection Direc-
tive and ePrivacy Directive (Directive 2002/58/EC) (ʻOpinion 15/2011 on the def-
inition of consentʼ adopted on 13 July 2011 (WP 187)).
47）　The heavy onus of assessing a foreign legal system was pointed out before the 
judgement of the Schrems case (Christopher Kuner, ʻDeveloping an Adequate Le-
gal Framework for International Data Transfersʼ in Serge Gutwirth et al. (eds), 
Reinventing Data Protection? (Springer 2009) 263, 265─267).
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adequacy of the level of protection of a third country and prohibit a data con-
troller from transferring data to a recipient in a third country. This interpre-
tation is in line with the Schrems judgement.
　Thirdly, they would have to review all adequacy decisions every time 
when a new right is declared such as ʻthe right to be forgottenʼ, because the 
Court, in paragraphs 76 and 77, asks the Commission and every Commis-
sioner to periodically check if the finding relating to the adequacy of the lev-
el of protection ensured by the third country in question is still factually and 
legally justified, and in judging this, it must take into consideration the cir-
cumstances that have arisen after that decisionʼs adoption.48） Therefore they 
need to judge whether a new admitted right is a fundamental component of 
the adequacy standard, and thus whether the right should be acknowledged 
in a third country even before the Court rules on the issue if asked. Follow-
ing this idea, Article 45(3) of the Regulation stipulates that the Commission 
review the assessment of the adequacy at least every four years taking into 
account all relevant developments in the third county.
　Although the Schrems judgement and the Regulation are logically sound, 
the Commission and Commissioners must shoulder a significant burden in 
the future, which cannot be ignored. However the second and third part of 
their tasks can be lessened because the expectation would be that all com-
missioners would be in agreement on such an assessment of adequacy. It is 
hard to envisage a situation in which some EU countries acknowledge ade-
quacy for a third country, but some do not. Moreover, the matter of adequa-
cy of a third country is directly relevant to international relations between 
the EU and a third country. Therefore, it seems desirable for the EU as a 
48）　In paragraph 76 and 77, the Court only refers to the role of the Commission, 
but as it states in paragraph 50 that either the Commission or Commissioners 
have the authority to evaluate whether a third country has an adequate level of 
protection of privacy, it is clear the Commissioners must shoulder the same task.
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whole to sort out this problem as the investigation by each commissioner 
can be duplicative. A single judgement on adequacy would be of great bene-
fit to both the EU and to a third country wishing to obtain adequacy accreditation.
(2) Accommodating National Security Law
　A much more serious problem of cross-border data transfer is that it 
seems impossible for any legal or contract schemes to evade security law in 
third countries. As security laws have, in most cases, the strongest binding 
legal force in the domestic legal hierarchy except for constitutional law, no 
other legal instruments can surpass them. Therefore, international treaties, 
not to mention BCRs or SCCs, can be powerless in the face of security laws.
　Every country has its own national security law and it seems inconceiv-
able to design a data transfer scheme which can avoid consideration of the 
requirements of national security. Moreover, every country has its own cir-
cumstances regarding its national security which is very much affected by 
relations with its surrounding countries. In other words, the stability and the 
structure of security laws vary greatly between countries.
　Furthermore, the actual implementation of security laws may readily 
change to become more severe in the face of serious threats to a country. Al-
though the EU has been criticizing the many loopholes in the US security 
laws, we have seen this reality in Europe when France suffered from the si-
multaneous terrorist attack on 13 November 2015. On the basis of the Stat-
ute of 1955 (as amended), the initial 12 day state of emergency was declared 
by a decree of the Council of Ministers.49） Then the Parliament extended the 
49）　The state of emergency had been governed by a statute but is under consider-
ation for incorporation into the Constitution after the November 2015 terrorist at-
tack. In France, there are two other emergency laws under the Constitution. One 
is the enforcement of Article 16 of the Constitution and the other is the state of 
siege under Article 36 of the Constitution. In the case of the state of emergency 
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declaration several times, which made it possible for the police to indiscrimi-
nately search and seize virtually anything including personal data. The situa-
tion lasted for up to eight months and finally ended in July 2016.
　In this way, considering the fact that security laws may change and thus 
treatment under the laws may change as the laws are affected by domestic 
and international circumstances of each country, it will be a big challenge 
for the EU to set a minimum or sufficient standard for handling data under 
security laws which can be applicable even to the Member States. More im-
portantly, if the EU tries to secure our privacy even in the area of security 
laws outside of the EU territory, it will face difficulty in establishing unified 
minimum security codes which could save and satisfy any social order perti-
nent to the EU.
　Since it seems impossible to agree on a minimum standard for security 
laws, consent seems to be the only feasible approach in this area. As trans-
mission and communication of information became cheap and convenient 
thanks to the Internet, people gained the ability to communicate with each 
other much more easily than before. Consequently, these tools became use-
ful for those who planned organised crimes and terrorist attacks. To guaran-
tee the secrecy of communication through the Internet at the same way as in 
the past may leave room for freely gathering or exchanging information for 
terrorists alike. People gain more communicative powers, but we may have 
to consider accepting the extra responsibilities and risks involved with using 
these tools.
　Also, if you want to use a service from a US-based company, it can be ar-
gued that you should be willing to accept the terms and conditions like those 
under a statue, police powers will be exercised by civil authorities as usual, but 
these powers will be extended. In the cases of the emergency under constitution-
al laws, the police powers will be transferred from civil to military authorities and 
be extended.
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living in the US. Following this idea, if you are unhappy about the security 
laws of a country where your data will be conveyed, you have to give up 
making a contract with the data exporter. This ʻtake it or leave itʼ approach 
can be applicable particularly in most B to B international data transfer cas-
es. While consent plays an important role in the area of intelligence law, the 
US government should simultaneously look into more privacy-considerate 
intelligence laws.
　It is true that consent is questionable in many respects. It is well under-
stood that as the average person does not often read or fully understand a 
privacy policy, consent is becoming meaningless. In the case of intelligence 
law, only a few may understand the legal system. Nonetheless this doesnʼt 
mean that self-management of privacy is becoming less important. On the 
contrary, consent continues to play a key role in managing this right.
(3) New EU-US Agreement ─ Privacy Shield
　After the Shrems judgement, the US was forced to make a new arrange-
ment. Fortunately, after about two yearsʼ negotiation, the US has succeeded 
in reaching a new agreement with the European Commission ─ the so-
called Privacy Shield50）─ on personal data exchange with the EU in Febru-
ary 2016,51） and has achieved another adequacy accreditation on 12 July 
2016.52） The Commission announced that the EU-US Privacy Shield data 
50）　The Privacy Shield regime can be understood as a package which includes a 
number of documents issued by several US institutions. The whole package list 
can be found in the letter from US Department of Commerce to European Com-
mission available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/privacy-
shield-adequacy-decision-annex-1_en.pdf.
51）　ʻPrivacy Shield Framework Principles Issued by the U.S. Department of Com-
merceʼ can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/privacy-
shield-adequacy-decision-annex-2_en.pdf.
52）　ʻCOMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION of 12.7.2016 pursuant to Direc-
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transfer arrangement is fully operational and US companies are able to sign 
up with the Department of Commerce.53）
　Following the Safe Harbour scheme, the Privacy Shield arrangement is 
based on a system of self-certification by which US organisations commit to 
a set of privacy principles. The agreement is said to provide companies in 
both the US and the EU with a mechanism to comply with EU data protec-
tion requirements when transferring personal data from the EU to the US. 
The argument over the Safe Harbour agreement did help to enhance the 
transparency and level of data protection in the US intelligence laws. The 
new agreement, though it may incur problems in the assessment of adequa-
cy, is certainly welcomed by companies both in the US and the EU.
　The main differences between the Safe Harbour arrangement and the Pri-
vacy Shield arrangement are elucidated by the European Commission.54） It 
puts new features such as an ombudsman, redress and annual joint review 
mechanisms in place.55） When we look at the redress mechanism briefly, EU 
citizenʼs complaints have to be resolved by companies within 45 days and a 
free-of-charge Alternative Dispute Resolution solution is available. EU citi-
zens can also go to their national Data Protection Authorities who will work 
with the US Department of Commerce and FTC to ensure that unresolved 
complaints are investigated and resolved.
　However, the question of the substantive minimum criteria of intelligence 
tive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of 
the protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shieldʼ C(2016) 4176 final.
53）　The Privacy Shield website by the U.S. Department of Commerce is available 
at https://www.privacyshield.gov/welcome.
54）　ʻFact Sheet, EU-U.S. Privacy Shield: Frequently Asked Questionsʼ issued on 29 
February 2016.
55）　For a brief explanation of the agreement, see e.g., European Commission ʻEU-
US Privacy Shieldʼ issued in February 2016 (http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/files/factsheets/factsheet_eu-us_privacy_shield_en.pdf).
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law is still haunting us. In fact, the US does not affirm complete absence of 
bulk collection or mass surveillance while it is strongly stated that the limita-
tions and safeguards are set out therein. We could even suspect that it tries 
to evade the question of the criteria problem on security law by putting the 
emphasis on imposing stronger obligations on companies and establishing 
several new redress mechanisms. We may have to wait for a CJEU judge-
ment whether this sort of data gathering with appropriate safeguard mea-
sures is exceptionally allowed.56）
56）　See the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) cases such as Szabo and 
Vissy v. Hungary App No 37138/14 (12 January 2016) and Roman Zakharov v. 
Russia App No 47143/06 (4 December 2015).
　　These cases involve a problem of indiscriminate and mass personal data gath-
ering. In the case of the former, whether the Hungarian laws which established 
the Anti-Terrorism Task Force and gave it a power of secret intelligence gather-
ing interfered with privacy right or not was at issue. The prerogatives in this field 
include secret house search and surveillance with recording, opening of letters 
and parcels, as well as checking and recording the contents of electronic or com-
puterised communications without the consent of the persons concerned. The 
ECtHR ruled that the Court must scrutinise the question as to whether the devel-
opment of surveillance methods resulting in masses of data collected has been 
accompanied by a simultaneous development of legal safeguards securing respect 
for citizensʼ Convention rights (paragraph 68) and eventually found that the Hun-
garian law violated Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights be-
cause the law did not provide safeguards sufficiently precise, effective and com-
prehensive on the ordering, execution and potential redressing of such measures 
(paragraph 89).
　　In the case of the latter, an applicant brought an action against three mobile 
network operators, claiming that there had been an interference with his right to 
the privacy of his telephone communications. He also claimed that the mobile 
network operators had installed equipment which permitted the Federal Security 
Service to secretly intercept all telephone communications without prior judicial 
authorisation. The Court mentioned that the assessment of the Russian laws con-
cerned depends on all the circumstances such as the nature, scope and duration 
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　Additionally, the adequacy standards for a bilateral agreement like the Pri-
vacy Shield arrangement or possibly for an international organisation seem 
to be different from those for a third country especially on the issue of the 
existence of an independent oversight body, and this makes the precise un-
derstanding of the adequacy standards more confusing for us. However we 
feel that the European Commission (purposely?) ignores this fact.
　Finally, it is natural that bilateral agreements including the Privacy Shield 
arrangement focus on solving problems between parties concerned, but it 
can also be viewed as a makeshift solution from a third partyʼs perspective. 
While the US is a significant business partner for the EU, whether the Com-
mission would be willing to conclude an agreement similar to the Privacy 
Shield agreement with other smaller business partners like Japan is un-
known. In any case, the content and mechanism of the agreement is so com-
plicated even for privacy scholars that it is doubtful if other third countries 
can immediately use it as a reference. However, we should continue to moni-
tor how the EU handles cases pertinent to the agreement in the future.
of the possible measures, the grounds required for ordering them, the authorities 
competent to authorise, carry out and supervise them, and the kind of remedy 
provided by the national law and the Court has to determine whether the proce-
dures for supervising the ordering and implementation of the restrictive mea-
sures are such as to keep the ʻinterferenceʼ to what is ʻnecessary in a democratic 
societyʼ (paragraph 232). In conclusion, the Court ruled that the Russian laws do 
not provide for adequate and effective guarantees against arbitrariness and the 
risk of abuse (paragraph 302).
　　Considering these cases, it seems that the ECtHR itself does not deny the pos-
sibility of indiscriminate, mass and secret surveillance in an exceptional situation 
under very strict conditions.
